Duquesne Law Review
Volume 5

Number 2

Article 11

1966

Torts - Governmental Immunity
John R. McGinley Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. McGinley Jr., Torts - Governmental Immunity, 5 Duq. L. Rev. 211 (1966).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol5/iss2/11

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

1966-1967]

RECENT DECISIONS

thereunder is determined from the date of exercise. But, under the
majority rule, if B were the donee of a general testamentary power and he
made the appointments in the same manner, the appointments thereunder
are invalid if measured from the creation. But if one analyses the examples in a "restraint of alienation" context, it can be seen that where C is
the donee the property is "tied up" for a longer period. This is so because
the power cannot be exercised until 21 years after B's death. Where B is
the donee, the power must be exercised, if at all, under B's will when he
dies. Yet, the former is valid and the latter invalid under the majority rule
although in the former the property cannot be "brought into the
market" until a later period. 3 To so state is inconsistent and permits a
scheme to be carried out by some words which cannot be done by others.
"[T]here is serious objection to a rule, purporting to express a policy,
which declares that this scheme can be carried out by some words and
cannot be carried out by others."2 4 Such objections can be made to the
"majority view" here and it must be concluded that the holding of the
court in Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Barrett answers such objections and
is consistent with obviating the technical harshness of the rule.2 5
Richard S. Dorizaun
ToRTs-Governmental Immunity-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
refuses to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966).
Plaintiff, a minor, and her guardian brought suit against the defendant
for injuries sustained in a fall on the school's icy steps. The trial court
sustained a demurrer based on sovereign immunity from tort liability.
On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court's
order, held that it could not undertake piecemeal judicial reform of a
was invalid when created. C was not in being at the creation of the power and it is possible
that C would live more than 21 years after the death of A and B and might not be able to
exercise the power (he cannot until he dies) until such time. But this problem goes to the
validity of a power when created and not appointments made under a valid power. See
Kales, supra note 14, at 64-65.
23. See Thorndike, supra note 14, at 715.
24. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 24.9.

25. "The Rule persists in personifying itself to me as an elderly female clothed in the
dress of a bygone period who obtrudes her personality into current affairs with burst of
indecorous energy." Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror
65 HARv. L. REV. 721, 725

(1952).

By its decision, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island

has taken a step in clothing the lady in more "modern garb."
See the above cited article generally for some proposed solutions to the problems created
by the Rule against Perpetuities. However, it should be noted that although this article is.
cited in Barrett, - R.I. at -, 220 A.2d at 524, one of the problems not discussed in the
article is that which was before the court.
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doctrine which should be abolished by legislative action.1 Consequently,
the court adopted a rationale rejected by other jurisdictions which have
abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity by judicial fiat.2
In 1963, the court discarded the doctrine of charitable immunity'
despite strong objections to a judicial assumption of a legislative function.4 The adoption of the judicial intrusion argument to sustain the
privilege accorded governmental agencies and the rejection of it in
abolishing the doctrine of charitable immunity indicates an incongruity
which needs clarification.
The Dillon majority may be separated into two distinct groups. One
segment has uniformly recommended legislative action in both areas,5
i.e., governmental and charitable immunity, while the second is comprised
of those justices who rejected the judicial intrusion argument in abolishing
the privilege granted to charities and accepted it in sustaining governmental immunity.'
An analysis of the four-fold rationale7 of the Flagiello case,' which
abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity fails to provide a rational
justification for this latter position. The most important step in the
rationale of Flagiello was the rejection of the theoretical validity of the
concept of charitable immunity.9 Modern justification for the doctrine
of governmental immunity has also been criticized by numerous other
jurisdictions ° and legal writers." Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme
1. 422 Pa. at 105, 220 A.2d at 898.
2. In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959),
the court stated that "having found that doctrine (i.e. governmental immunity) to be
unsound and unjust under present conditions, we consider that we have not only the right
but the duty to abolish that doctrine." See also Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1960), and Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264
Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), where the doctrine was overruled prospectively.
3. The doctrine of charitable immunity protected charitable institutions from liability
for torts committed by their employees. Sidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh,
353 Pa. 408, 416, 45 A.2d 59, 62 (1946).
4. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 519, 532, 208 A.2d 193, 210, 216 (1965),
where Chief Justice Bell and Justice Jones dissented and urged that legislative action,
not judicial reform, was the proper tool to abolish charitable immunity.
5. This group is comprised of Chief Justice Bell and Justice Jones. See discussion in
note 4 supra.
6. This group is composed of Justice Cohen and Justice O'Brien. In the Fagiello case,
Justice O'Brien joined in the majority opinion whereas Justice Cohen filed a concurring
opinion stating his basis for abolishing the doctrine of charitable immunity.
7. Comment, 26 U. PmTr. L. REv. 749, 754 (1965).
8. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
9. Cf. comment cited note 7 supra.
10. See cases cited note 2 supra.
11. Proposals set forth to justify the retention of the doctrine have been varied. They
have included assertions that immunity should be granted to a governmental agency because
torts are never authorized and are, therefore, ultra vires. However, the ultra vires doctrine
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Court itself has admitted that the errors in logic which spawned the
doctrine have been exposed. 12 Secondly, Flagiello conceded that immunity
works an injustice by compelling injured parties to bear the loss occasioned
by another's negligence." While discussing this facet of the opinion the
court acknowledged that government would mean very little if it exempted
portions of the population from liability on the theory that the public
right transcends the claim of the individual. 14 As it is, the immunity
granted to governmental agencies works injustice by relieving a wrongdoer
from liability. Application of the concept would also generate disrespect
for a government which almost arbitrarily denies recovery in certain
instances while allowing compensation in others."5 Thirdly, Flagiello stated
that the abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity would induce
greater care on the part of protected institutions. 16 If the threat of
liability would have that effect on charities, no reason is apparent why
such a menace would not have an equivalent influence on sheltered
governmental agencies. This factor assumes greater significance in view
of government's expanding involvement with society. Finally, Flagiello
indicated that the court never had the prerogative to establish a blanket
immunity because this form of privilege is opposed to the tenets of a
democratic society." The principle of governmental immunity is similarly
a judicially innovated"' blanket exemption, and its retention would, likewise, seem offensive to a democratic system. An anlysis of the Flagiello
decision fails to expose any foundation for the court's retention of the
has prevented liability only when the tortious act was committed
delegated to the employee. The supposed lack of a corporate fund has
a reason for retention. This had been construed as a carry-over from
immunity. Since the trust fund theory is insufficient to justify the
immunity, it should not be advanced in support of governmental

outside the authority
also been advanced as
the area of charitable
doctrine of charitable
immunity. Fuller and
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability In Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437, 438-441 (1941). The
doctrine of governmental immunity has been criticized as resting upon a misinterpretation
of the sovereignty of the king and anomalous when applied in the United States. Borchard,
Governmental Immunity In Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1924). See also Borchard, Governmental Immunity In Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1928), Comment, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 441 (1966).
12. In Morris v. Mount Lebanon School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 635, 144 A.2d 737, 738
(1958), the court stated that the errors in history, logic and policy which gave rise to the
doctrine have been exposed.
13. 417 Pa. at 506, 208 A.2d at 203.
14. Ibid.
15. An individual may recover from the government if the tort is committed by an
employee engaged in a proprietary as distinguished from governmental function. In Morris
v. Mount Lebanon School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 637, 144 A.2d 737, 739 (1958), the court stated
that "perhaps there is no issue known to the law which is surrounded by more confusion
than the question whether a given municipal operation is governmental or proprietary in
nature."
16. 417 Pa. at 504-505, 208 A.2d at 202.
17. Id. at 504, 208 A.2d at 202.
18. The doctrine of governmental tort immunity was introduced into Pennsylvania law
by the case of Fox v. Northern Lights, 3 W. & S. 103 (1841).
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immunity accorded governmental agencies after withdrawing the privilege
from charitable institutions.
Inquiry into Justice Cohen's concurring opinion in Flagiello19 fails to
reconcile the apparent inconsistency in the court's position. He relied
primarily on the Michigan case of Parker v. Port Huron Hosp.2 ° Parker
recognized the fact that the doctrine of charitable immunity had been
judicially assimilated, and therefore, could be dismantled by judicial
fiat. 2 In abolishing charitable immunity Parker negated the stare decisis
argument by holding that the maxim was not meant to perpetuate error.22
This rationale is equally applicable in the area of governmental immunity.
Accordingly, some persuasion not present in the case of charitable
immunity must be found in order to sustain the position of the court
in Dillon. Although not enunciated, this component may originate in the
complexity of the reform required to effect abolition. 23 The essence of this
complexity is not, however, defined. It is submitted that this definition
was omitted because the nature of the reform required to abolish governmental immunity is indistinguishable from the action which was initiated
with Flagiello. The abrogation of governmental immunity would impose
liability on many previously sheltered governmental agencies just as
the withdrawal of the privilege accorded charities imposed liability on
many previously insulated charitable institutions.24
A final rationale proposed by some jurists involves an interpretation of
legislative inactivity. It has been asserted that the failure of a legislature
to act upon a bill which is before it expresses an intent to leave the law
as it stands.25 In 1961, a bill providing for partial waiver of the Commonwealth's tort immunity died in committee. 2' This inaction could be interpreted as a desire of the people to retain the doctrine. However, the court
did not adopt this argument with respect to charitable immunity after a
bill to abolish that privilege likewise died in committee in 196 1.27
Past action of the court in other areas fails to provide an answer for
19. 417 Pa. at 515, 208 A.2d at 208.
20. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 366 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
21. Id. at 11, 105 N.W.2d at 6.
22. Id. at 10, 105 N.W.2d at 6.
23. In Dillon, 422 Pa. at 106, 220 A.2d at 898, the court intimates that this is a distinguishing factor when it speaks of the complexity of the reform which would be required.
24. The doctrine of charitable immunity extended protection to institutions other than
hospitals. Included within the definition of charitable institutions were religious, educational
and cemetery organizations and the Young Men's Christian Association. 14 C.J.S. Charities
§ 2 (1939).
25. In Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 223, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96, 359 P.2d
457, 464 (1960), Justice Schauer, in dissent, stated that the failure of a legislature to change
a law which is generally before it . . . is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands.
26. Pa. H.R. Res. 75, Gen. Assembly, 145th Sess. (1961).
27. Pa. S. Res. 59, Gen. Assembly, 145th Sess. (1961).
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its refusal to abolish governmental immunity after it had abrogated the
immunity accorded to charities. This analysis reveals an actual incongruity in maintaining a rule which imposes hardship on injured parties
and perpetuates a deleterious doctrine.
John R. McGinley, Jr.

TORTs-Products Liability-Restatement (Second), Torts, § 402(A)The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopts a strict tort liability rule for
the products liability area.
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
Plaintiff brought an action in trespass against a beer distributor, brewer,
and manufacturer for injuries resulting from the explosion of a beer
keg which had been purchased by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff relied on a
theory of exclusive control and the trial court dismissed the complaint
because all parties whose conduct could have affected the condition of the
keg had not been joined as defendants.' This judgment was vacated and
plaintiff was given2 leave to amend his complaint and proceed on a theory
of strict liability.
The court decided the case not on the doctrine of exclusive control but
on the more determinative issue of "the nature and scope of the liability
in trespass of one who produces or markets a defective product for use or
consumption." 3 With one dissent, the court followed the modern trend
toward strict liability by adopting Section 402(A) 4 of the Restatement
1. The plaintiff's father and brother who had handled the keg were not joined as defendants and were unable to be joined because the Statute of Limitations had run. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).

2. Chief Justice Bell, dissenting, sharply criticised the court for allowing plaintiff to
proceed on a theory not pleaded by him. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 429, 220 A.2d 853,

859 (1966). Although a strict products liability theory was not pleaded, plaintiff did urge
the adoption of Section 402(A) in a supplemental brief. Supplemental Brief for Appellant.
3. 422 Pa. at 425, 220 A.2d at 854.
4. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS, 402(A)

(1965):

Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical

harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a)

(2)

the seller is engaged in

the business of selling such a product, and

it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relationships with the seller.
(b)

